



**STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
PROJECT**

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**THE MEDIA, INTELLIGENCE, AND INFORMATION  
PROLIFERATION: MANAGING AND LEVERAGING THE CHAOS**

**BY**

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THE MEDIA, INTELLIGENCE, AND INFORMATION PROLIFERATION: MANAGING  
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## **ABSTRACT**

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The media, whether print or more recently television, have always had an impact, to varying degrees, on public opinion, political decision making, and ultimately, and at least arguably the commitment of military forces. It is absolutely imperative that strategic leaders stay attuned to media reporting and information proliferation, its potential impact on their organization or institution, and find ways to manage the chaos and leverage that coverage and flow of information. Leveraging the coverage only refers to improving and maintaining the leadership's situational awareness in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) world. In some cases this visionary awareness must be maintained in a region or country not well covered by the intelligence community's systems. It may also be in a region where we have limited diplomatic, or even nongovernmental organization (NGO) access. The strategic leader has an obligation to maintain this awareness in order to take prudent cautionary steps to ensure his/her military organization or institution is not caught flatfooted, as forces are committed. It is essential that leadership at all levels be willing to get beyond institutional, cultural, and historical bias to more fully leverage all available data, to include open source and media information.



## **PREFACE**

We live in a world that has become more and more a model of VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity). There is little chance the world will become more concrete or predictable in nature for the Strategic Leader of the future. This reality should not dissuade us from finding ways to clarify what we can. Through the help of many this project aims to help move that inch-at-a-time towards more clarity and strategic vision.



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### The Impact and Importance of the Media and Open Sources

The media, whether print or more recently television, have always had an impact, to varying degrees, on public opinion, political decision making, and ultimately, and at least arguably the commitment of military forces. It is absolutely imperative that strategic leaders remain attuned to media reporting and the proliferation of other forms of open source information saturating the world scene. They must clearly envision its potential impact on their organization or institution, and more importantly, find ways to manage the chaos and leverage the flow of what will become an even more significant volume of information in the future. Leveraging the coverage should not be confused with manipulation of the media, but simply improving and maintaining the leadership's situational awareness. In some cases, this visionary awareness must be maintained in a region or country not well covered by the intelligence community's systems. It may also be in a region where we have limited diplomatic, or even nongovernmental organization (NGO) access. The strategic military leader has an obligation to maintain this awareness in order to take prudent cautionary steps to ensure his/her military organization or institution is not caught flatfooted, as forces are committed. If the past is any indication, these potential military commitments, will likely be into inhospitable environments, with at least initially vague

political objectives, and with military forces less than optimally trained or organized to operate and survive under that specific set of circumstances. It is essential that leadership at all levels be willing to get beyond institutional, cultural, and historical bias in order to more fully use all available data, to include open source and media information.

There will be no cookie-cutter solution at the end of this examination of the Media, Intelligence, and Information Proliferation. Focus will be on pointing to the importance of managing the chaos of information flow. This limited dialogue will be focused on exploitation of what will exist in the future, whether strategic leaders take advantage of it or not. Many organizations to some degree use some open source information and intelligence in helping to maintain situational awareness. During the course of this research, detailed joint programs documented in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) were not found. A requirement for continued dialogue on the subject is a necessity.

This research project is a written effort to explain how important this information flow may be in the future. There must be an effort to document the TTP to more fully leverage these valuable sources of information and to train future leaders to more fully appreciate all information regardless of its source.

This paper's intent is to show the reader the media's potential to provide information to a general public and political leaders that sometimes don't know, and if they know, don't care about significant events around the world or occasionally even down the street. It's important for military leaders and their staffs to remember how often news coverage can provide the initial indication of a situation that may lead to military involvement. As present and future leaders realize the significant gains in using systematic methods of exploiting the media and other open sources, they must attempt to better manage the chaos while helping themselves to better situational awareness.

Historical "baggage" collected over the years by the military in its relationship with the media will be examined to understand why this relationship continues to be less than optimal. During the course of this paper there will be a review of examples of some of media misperceptions and historical problems collected over the years. Examples of published views of just a few others that have suggested using more open source information will be covered also. A survey of attitudes at the Army War College was conducted during the course of this project. A detailed review and analysis of the results of that survey and suggestions for future study will also be covered later in this paper. Finally, this paper will share a few

thoughts about a systemic approach to collecting, verifying, confirming, analyzing, cross-cueing, and using media and other types of open source information.

### The Military's Historical Relationship with the Media

It's important to reflect on the historical barriers between the military and the media. The military must review how it can harness some of the information that flows today and the exponential flow caused by future communications devices. It is essential to understand why strategic leaders sometimes have an aversion to becoming educated in the current and future media and information trends. It will become more important in the future to understand how these prolific sources of information and chaos can and should be leveraged and managed. If a balance is struck between classified and unclassified sources of information the media and unconventional information outlets in the future could assist the intelligence community in its requirement to meet national security objectives.

A significant historical relationship between the media and military may explain why the military and government in general don't always take full advantage of the positive aspects to be gained by leveraging the media's significant capabilities. This paper will review some of the history, politics, and myths surrounding the media and the printed word in general. In a Cantigny Conference Series Special Report, Reporting War When

there is No War, Chapter II entitled From Bull Run to Bosnia, the authors contrast the give and take over the years of the military and the Media.<sup>1</sup>

The media and the military have shared a long history. For example, the First Battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861, is significant because of the large number of reporters that participated in the Northern rout back to Washington. The history and relationship has been continuous and ever changing up through Desert Storm, to operations described as "Operations Other than War," where the media has been and will likely continue to be on the scene as U.S. forces arrive. From those first days at Bull Run, the media have used any and all technologies available during a given historical period. During the Battle of Bull Run, the media were for the first time characterized as being timely. This timeliness is attributed to the advent of the telegraph. Although the reporting was more timely, it was also characterized as being rarely objective.<sup>2</sup>

The media and their relationship with the military and the government in general have gone through many metamorphic states. Military and government leaders should fully realize that media organizations will very likely be on the leading edge of communications technology and will be "selling" a story to a public who is willing to pay. It is important for the military to avoid dwelling negatively on the past. One of the most

practical and healthy views of the media and the military came from a Marine Corps Warrant Officer during Desert Storm.

In Johanna Neuman's Book, Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics? Chief Warrant Officer Eric Carlson was quoted as saying, "We didn't view the news media as a group of people we were supposed to schmooze." "We regarded them as an environmental feature of the battlefield, kind of like the rain. If it rains, you operate wet."<sup>3</sup>

This simple illustration displayed how the leadership of the deployed Marines ingrained a healthy, matter-of-fact view of the military's relationship to the media. Negative emotive behavior was not part of the plan. The important side benefit of the Marine Corps' view was positive press coverage of their war efforts. It has been generally recognized that the Marines in the Gulf received a significant and positive portion of the media coverage when compared to the larger Army force. From the top down, they did not waste time reliving past wars and blaming the media for political problems in the past. This paper suggests it is much better to avoid being overly concerned about the media who will cover and write something about military operations whether prudent, matter-of-fact preplanning is conducted, or valuable time is wasted battling against the inevitable.

Open source information will be flowing from distant lands where intelligence sources are few and far between whether we have a system to use it or not. The military must take a calm,

dispassionate view of the media and open source materials in general. It must take full advantage of its potential while avoiding some of the slippery slopes associated with becoming overly dependent on this type of information exclusively. A skillful application of multi-disciplined intelligence assets is vital to avoid being tricked by potential adversaries.

### The Media's Use of Technology: Does it Drive Policy?

This section will explore, and hopefully dispel some of the negative, stereotypical, and possibly flawed views many in the military hold about the media's role, and effect in shaping foreign policy. Not much of the evidence is empirical and unimpeachable. With an open mind, the military reader should at least agree that no matter what the role of technology and the media, political leaders are responsible for making hard decisions, hopefully with the country's national interest and core values in the forefront of their minds.

The one truth that seems to ring loud and clear is the fact that the high tech flow of information has clearly compressed the time and space continuum for strategic policy makers, diplomats, and military leaders. Despite this compression of time, strategic leaders do not have the luxury of avoiding policy decision-making. They must still take into account what is best for the country, its people, its allies and friends, and in some instances just plain humanity in general.

One of the better sources of a detailed historical perspective on the subject is a book by Johanna Neuman, Lights, Camera, War Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?. The media and policy are placed in a historical perspective, from Gutenberg's Revolution, to our nation and world's more catastrophic events of the 1990s. Rather than attempt to evaluate all of the evidence in this book, only a quote of what can be considered the synthesis of the author's efforts and thoughts will be covered:

*"This book argues, instead, that while technology has enabled faster feedback from the public in matters of war and peace, while it has speeded the deliberative process and shortened reaction time, while it has written a new job description for diplomats and given the public a sense of being there, it has not, in the end, changed the fundamentals of political leadership and international governance. Once past the wonder and marvel at the specter of two diplomats watching television together while telephones dangle in their hands, there comes the question, So what? Their mutual viewing influenced not at all the outcome of events, except to speed the flow of information. To view this increased pace of knowledge as a revolution in diplomacy and journalism is to misread history."*<sup>4</sup>

The two diplomats referred to were Strobe Talbott, ambassador-at-large to Russia, and an official of the Russian Foreign Ministry. They were watching the Russian White House as it was surrounded by the military with parliamentarians inside holding out against President Boris Yeltsin's reforms.<sup>5</sup>

## Media and Public Opinion

The media and its relationship and influence on public opinion is not clear cut nor is it unambiguous. In the book, Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990s, the author's summarize what they see as the future:

"Neither the public nor the media will likely dominate the foreign and defense policy-making process anytime soon, if ever. Although the greater public knowledge of issues provided by the media is not a threat to the roles of formal governmental institutions and experts, the government must be more aware and sensitive than before-which is what democratic government is about."<sup>6</sup>

It is probably worth discussing how most literature on the subject categorizes the public. As the debate about public opinion and the media continues to rage each time a significant world event explodes in our nation's face it may be helpful to recognize the roles of not only the media, but also the government. There is no time to delve deeply, but only to mention that the authors of the book quoted above, and many others segment the public four ways. These publics are, *The Uninformed Public* (75 to 80 percent), *The Informed Public* (10 to 20 percent), *The Effective Public (elite)* (less than 5 percent), and *Core Decision-Makers* (small number of actual policy formulators and executors).<sup>7</sup>

This paper will only address in brief the category called *The Uninformed Public*. Although they comprise as much as 80

percent of the public, they are considered a group that does not seek out information about international affairs and, in fact, avoid those parts of news broadcasts. The authors of the referenced book point out, *The Uninformed Public* tends, to only get involved under three circumstances. First, if the foreign policy has a direct bearing on them personally (conscription for Vietnam, 1980 boycott of Olympics). Secondly, when broad publicity is given to events (Kurdish refugees fleeing, Hostage crises in Teheran 1979,80). Lastly, when there is a concerted effort by the government and others to mobilize public opinion (When President Bush mobilized the reserve components for Operation Desert Shield and Storm).<sup>8</sup> Most literature seems to indicate general public opinion is difficult to mobilize and probably in day-to-day foreign policy is not a full time player. Unless the media see a story they feel the public wishes to hear about, their impact may be overstated by most in the military and public in general.

One final thought about public opinion and foreign policy from Johanna Neuman's book.

"...the Spanish-American War becomes a case study for the core themes of this book: that journalism's influence on policy is often overrated, that political leaders have more sway than journalists in shaping public opinion, and that, finally, diplomats are responsible for diplomacy, no matter how exasperating the press exaggerations."<sup>9</sup>

The subject of public opinion and the media in general is exceedingly difficult to come to grips with in a concrete manner as most would prefer to view the world. It is probably enough to say mobilizing public opinion is not easy, and in most cases, foreign events beyond our control may create unexpected public opinion shifts within the United States. Regardless, diplomats and political leaders are responsible for foreign policy, not the media.

The Gap Between Policy Practitioners' Perceptions and  
Public Attitudes<sup>10</sup>

It is hard for the "Policy Practitioners" to read the public's attitudes about foreign policy. In a study published in October 1997, it was clear congressional views of what they thought the public wanted failed to match the empirical research data collected using various focus groups. The study showed a significant gap between the Practitioners and the Public.

One of the Studies' concluding paragraphs illustrated the perception gap mentioned above. "When asked what they thought the majority of Americans felt about the US role in the world in the wake of the Cold War, a very strong majority of practitioners said most Americans want the US to disengage. This view was especially strong among members of Congress and their staffs. Polling data, however, indicate clearly that the majority of Americans do not want to disengage. Nor has this sentiment increased significantly since the end of the Cold War. At least two out of three Americans still say the US should take an active part in World affairs, just as they have for decades."<sup>11</sup>

It's enough to conclude by pointing out how complicated and imprecise the subject of public opinion really is. Trying to guess precisely where the public stands on any given issue may be difficult for military leaders. They must use all sources of information to stay attuned to the environment around them.

### Technology Now and in the Future, the Reasons we Must Tap Open

#### Sources of Information

The requirement to tap open sources will be significantly magnified with the proliferation of technological advances. The intelligence system must think well outside the traditional box in providing intelligence and information necessary to maintain situational awareness in the future.

One of the best sources of information on the changing face of technology and how it will impact the media and military was The Changing Nature of Conflict, a book published following a Cantigny Conference Series, August 23-25, 1995. Mr. Martin Libicki, a senior fellow at the Advanced Command Technologies and Information Strategies Group for the National Defense University's Institute of National Strategic Studies, addressed the conference on the subject of "The Media and the Military in the Bitstream Business."<sup>12</sup> Mr. Libicki prefaced his remarks to the conference by, "asserting that though the military and the media will never be in the same business, their techniques are converging more and more. Both are moving rapidly into what he

called the bitstream business."<sup>13</sup> Mr. Libicki asked the conferees to imagine an era when ordinary citizens had easy access to video cameras and advanced broadcasting systems. His main point was that many technologies only available to the military and large organizations are becoming available to everyone that can afford them. Companies are expecting to put up satellites that will offer imagery resolution down to one meter.<sup>14</sup>

In summing up his lecture Mr. Libicki described the military and the media in the bitstream absorbing and producing business. He stated that, *"except for the fact that the military has ordnance, there is not going to be a whole lot of differences between the media and the military. That's the world in which we're going to have to get used to operating; it's going to be a world of bitstreams, and there are going to be a lot of independent producers, perhaps numbering in the millions. And in this world, what differentiates the media from the military?"*<sup>15</sup>

At the same conference, leading experts suggested 10 years from now they would not be surprised if there were personal communications devices that include not only audio, but also video. They predicted a reporter will bring man-packed devices and communicate from virtually anywhere in the world.<sup>16</sup>

Probably one of the most compelling reasons to aggressively pursue leveraging and tapping open source material is the significant increase in commercially available encryption capabilities for those bitstreams mentioned above and many others not mentioned. Since satellites, communications devices,

computers, and software production and distribution have become global in nature, there is no hope of depending only on the traditional intelligence methods to harvest required information.

The government of the United States and its allies will no longer have the only highly technical means of producing and reporting information on a global basis. Resource constraints, equipment and personnel limitations, and in some cases, a lack of diplomatic access must drive the intelligence community toward its greater use of other less traditional and more open sources of information.

#### Some Current Thoughts on Open Source Information

The most detailed article found suggesting the importance of, open source intelligence (OSINT), was a 1995 article in the "International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence," entitled The Importance of Open Source Intelligence To The Military. Although other available documents and publications were probably not utilized during this literature review, there is still evidence of a requirement for more government and military documentation, dialogue, and training. This documentation, dialogue, and training is required to fully use valuable open sources of information, while sensitizing senior military leaders to its importance.

Robert D. Steele's excellent and detailed article not only made the case for using open sources, but provided the leader an excellent primer on the possible sources of information and situations that have been utilized or could be in the future. It will be useful to give you the Intelligence Community's official definition of OSCINT:

*"By Open Source we refer to publicly available information appearing in print or electronic form. Open Source information may be transmitted through radio, television, and newspapers, or it may be distributed by commercial databases, electronic mail networks, or portable electronic media such as CD ROMs. It may be disseminated to a broad public, as are the mass media, or to a more select audience, such as gray literature, which includes conference proceedings, company shareholder reports, and local telephone directories. Whatever form it takes, Open Source involves no information that is: classified at its origin; is subject to proprietary constraints (other than copyright); is the product of sensitive contacts with U.S. or foreign persons; or is acquired through clandestine or covert means."*<sup>17</sup>

Mr. Steele pointed out several shortfalls in the definition, but are not important to this paper. He did touch on problems with using open source. He explained existing information-handling architectures for military intelligence processing and dissemination is all part of a classified means of transmission system. This makes processing open source information very difficult and has caused military operators to examine alternative methods of bypassing the intelligence community in order to give action officers at the policy level

and commanders at the operational level direct access to the information.<sup>18</sup>

Mr. Steele discussed three major advantages of open source intelligence for planning and conducting military operations:

- (1) When encountering requirements for military operations in Third World areas, or support of humanitarian assistance and counterterrorist operations, where intelligence priorities have not been high. He makes the case in these situations; open source intelligence is the only discipline able to respond rapidly.
- (2) OSCINT can achieve significant savings in lower cost, while providing information that may be more current. While saving money for some operations, other high priority mission gaps can then be covered by intelligence capabilities.
- (3) Finally he pointed out how OSCINT can protect national intelligence sources and methods by serving as the foundation for intelligence support to joint and coalition operations where it is not possible to reveal capabilities of the traditional community.<sup>19</sup>

*Mr. Steele suggests, "In general terms, OSCINT has significant potential as a source of intelligence support for indications and warning, policy development, contingency planning, security assistance, weapon acquisition (design and countermeasures), joint and coalition operations, and tactical operations against new priorities such as proliferation. Finally OSCINT is vital as a means of rapidly orienting a commander and serving as a foundation for collection management within traditional intelligence disciplines."*<sup>20</sup>

Robert Steele's article did an excellent job discussing obstacles to military exploitation of OSCINT. According to him these obstacles fall into three areas: (1) Organizationally the military relies on a classified intelligence community for its "intelligence." There are no well-established programs for contracting the private sector. (2) Culturally, there is a strong attitude that information achieves a special value only if it is classified. (3) Technically, the historical focus has been on training, equipping, and organizing forces for unilateral and conventional military operations. The assumption is intelligence will flow through traditional architecture. That traditional architecture is not designed to rapidly interface with joint and coalition forces, with Special Operations Forces and direct action clandestine teams, or with other private sector and non-military government elements with the ability to provide open source information to the commander.<sup>21</sup>

During the course of this project, several other good articles from the Marines focusing on Expeditionary Forces that find themselves preparing to go to areas most often known as, "a have-not region of the world," were found and reviewed. These articles focus primarily on supplementing other traditional sources of intelligence. The Steele article has been the best

in articulating the problems faced in exploiting what could be a much more valuable source of information.

During the literature review there was a failure to locate detailed and documented military or government programs for exploiting open source information. Once published architecture and TTP are a reality throughout the government, it will be even more important to advertise to our senior military leadership. It will be important in order to change the cultural bias against using non-classified information.

**Army War College Survey of Attitudes - The Media and Open Source Information - Its Effects and Perceived Utility**

One of the most important methods the military has to effect change within its ranks is the training and education system. There are no quick fixes for the problems or attitudes the military may have toward any given subject, to include the subject of this research project. It first takes recognition at the highest levels of leadership that change and training is required. Once the leadership decides change is important to the institution then an action plan must be found. Primary research at the Army War College was conducted during the course of this project. A survey was administered to the Army War College students and faculty. The data was analyzed with the intent of proving there is a direct correlation between higher level media training and the attitudes of the military.

Additionally, the attitude toward the usefulness of open source information would be different between groups. A focus of some of the research was the possible correlation between the attitudes of intelligence officers who must use open source material, and others who may not realize how much the intelligence community must use open sources to aid in their maintenance of situational awareness around the world. In **Survey Section A**, there is a detailed survey plan to include the survey instrument itself. In **Survey Section B**, there is a detailed display of tables, charts, and notes for most of the raw frequency data collected. Following an exhaustive review and analysis of the data collected three research models were developed and will be displayed in **Survey Section C**. A detailed summary of each research hypothesis and summary of results can be viewed in **Survey Section C** along with the research model tables. In this section of the paper an executive summary of the results with suggestions for further study will be provided.

#### **Executive Summary of Survey Results**

Army War College students and faculty were surveyed about their attitudes toward the media's affect on such things as public opinion, foreign policy, general usefulness of media and other open sources of information. The survey was conducted in November 1998. Five hundred questionnaires were sent through

local distribution. Twenty-five questionnaires were sent to outlying military intelligence officers (LTC/COL level) via e-mail. After three weeks, 261 usable surveys were returned with a broad cross-section of students, faculty, and selected additional military intelligence officers responding (**Survey Section B** Frequency Tables and graphs of pre-modeled surveyed population).

The survey primarily attempted to measure the differences in attitudes of the faculty and students, and military intelligence Officers and other students. Spurious variable control came in the form of eight questions in survey section one of the survey, while measuring attitudes toward the effect of the media and other open sources of information by using nine questions in section two (**Survey Section A**). After reviewing the collected data and running analysis, three of the independent variable questions in part one were dropped because of the lack of statistical validity. The other nine questions were utilized to formulate three research models (**Survey Section C**). The three research models complement the earlier literature research on the effects of the media on public opinion, the effects of the media on influencing foreign policy, and the usefulness of media and other open sources of information by the military.

It was felt, prior to the survey, research could show a statistically different attitude between the faculty from that

of the general student population. It was also felt that because of additional training, the faculty would have a more balanced view of the effect of the Media, and would feel it has a great deal of utility in maintaining situational awareness. In fact, the results summarized below and in more detail in **Survey Section C**, show that the faculty had, in statistical terms, a less severe view of the media in terms of crediting them with effecting either public opinion or foreign policy. Another interesting result was the faculty also did not see the media and open sources as useful as did the students or in particular, in a statistically significant way, the military intelligence officers.

In summary, there was a statistically significant correlation between the faculty's attitude toward the effects of the media on influencing the public opinion or foreign policy. They did not credit the media with as much influence as did the students. An additional interesting correlation was the fact that the more conservative members of the Army War College conversely credit the media with having a greater effect on influencing public opinion or foreign policy than do the more liberal members (statistically significant level). Pure civilians like the faculty credit the media with less effect in influencing public opinion or foreign policy, also at a statistically significant level.

As predicted, there was a very strong statistically significant correlation when considering the value and usefulness of the media and open source material. The military intelligence officers see the utility and value at a much higher rate than did all others.

The survey clearly did not have any external validity since nearly all the surveys went to Army War College related personnel. It did at least indicate that many of those that will likely be leading the Army, and in some cases other services, attribute a great deal of power and capability to the media in terms of altering public opinion, and a great deal of influence in establishing foreign policy. Taking into account the research above, they attribute much more power to the media than facts dictate. That strong opinion about the media, in particular when asked about the media's responsibility for causing the United States to commit forces in Somalia (69 percent) strongly agree and somewhat agreed - (Table B16) seem to indicate additional media training from the basic course through senior service college could be useful in balancing attitudes.

On a more positive note the general population sees the value of the media and other open source information. Eighty nine percent (89 percent) of the general surveyed population felt the news media and other open sources of information should be utilized in the future to maintain situational awareness

(Table B22). The future leadership will be willing to embrace the use of information flowing from many directions if the system can improve education, tactics techniques and procedures (TTP), and systems architecture.

One final note about the survey. A widely distributed survey measuring attitudes from the basic course officer through the senior service college officer level could be a first step toward understanding "the way ahead" to improve media and open source education for future military strategic leaders.

#### **SURVEY SECTION A:**

##### Discussion of Independent Variables and questions

##### supporting the research project:

Part I of the questions listed below separated major and minor groups being compared. The intent was to compare responses in Part II with major groups such as AWC students and faculty instructors. There was also a separation and comparison between MI related officers, and combat arms officers, combat support officers, and combat service support officers. There was a comparison among the various branches within the Army and other services. Many of the questions in this part were asked to identify spurious variables that might cause results to look skewed. Such things as political views could have a direct bearing on views of the media and views of their usefulness. Once the

data was collected, some categories of data were combined as appropriate to build what turned out to be three research models. The models reviewed the attitudes of various groups with respect to their convictions about the media's effect on public opinion, policy, and usefulness to the military. As the models were built some of the independent variables in part one below were redefined and in three cases dropped because of a lack of any significant correlation. The main object was to ensure as much data was collected for later modeling and analysis.

Part I questions (The plan going into the survey):

1. I am a War College ( ) student or ( ) faculty or ( ) \_\_\_\_\_.

(Used to compare War College Students and Faculty and selected other groups)

2. I am Senior Service College Graduate ( ) Yes ( ) No.

(Used to compare and control level of training in Media - graduates may be less negative toward the media, more willing to use open sources)

3. If military officer or former military officer your source of commission was ( ) ROTC ( ) Academy ( ) OCS ( ) Direct

(Academy Graduates may be less in touch with community and may have a more negative attitude towards the media and less willing to use open source information than other sources of commission)

4. I am ( ) military ( ) civilian ( ) civilian (former military).

(If enough pure civilians can be surveyed it may be logical to believe they may have a more positive attitude of the media than the military and former military whether faculty or student in AWC)

5. My Service category (civilians with no military skip to question 6)  
( ) Army ( ) Air Force ( ) Navy ( ) Marines ( ) Coast

Guard ( ) International Fellow

(This question helps compare negative and positive attitudes towards media's effect on such things and foreign policy and the use of open sources of information between the Army officers and other services and International Fellows, if enough surveys are returned by Ifs.)

6. Army Officers (former also) give your Branch/s and specialties:  
(AV/MI...15/35 etc.) \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/.

(This question helps separate and compare responses on Part II with MI branch related officers and combat arms officers, combat support, and combat service support officers.)

7. Did you serve (theater/region) in either Panama, Desert Shield/Storm, Somalia, and or Bosnia operation/s? ( ) Yes ( ) No

(This question will help see if there is any particular relationship between those that served in the region/theater in any of these operations and attitudes measured in part II.)

8. I consider my political views to be ( ) very liberal ( ) moderately liberal ( ) moderate ( ) moderately conservative ( ) very conservative.

(This question will help see if there is a correlation between attitudes and responses in PART II with political views. More conservative views should equal more negative responses to media's effect and less willingness to see the usefulness in open source information.)

Part II Summary of the nine questions with their purpose going into the survey:

Part II: For these nine survey questions please X a number from 1 to 5. 1 strongly agree 2 agree somewhat 3 neither agree nor disagree 4 disagree somewhat 5 disagree strongly

1. The news media many times are responsible for altering public opinion. ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5

(This question should help show the difference in attitudes and training level - Faculty members, and MI should have scores farther to the right. They should be less sure the media is responsible for altering public opinion. More conservative views should score closer to 1 than 5. Other interesting correlation's can be made between branches within the Army and services.) \*

2. The news media were responsible for causing the United States to commit forces in Somalia. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5

(This question will test the same groups as in the one above, but also will allow correlation between those that served in the theater/regions of the four conflicts.) \*\*

3. The news media were responsible for causing the United States to withdrawal from Somalia. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5

(This question will test the same as in one and two above. This question will allow correlation between question two and three in addition. It will be interesting to see attitudes towards the role of the media in getting us into Somalia and getting us out - Will there be a difference in attitudes?)\*\*

4. The news media were responsible for causing the United States to commit ground forces to Bosnia. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5

(This question will test the same as in one, two, and three above. This question will allow correlation between questions two, three, and four also to see if attitudes differed between the two operations (Somalia/Bosnia). It will be interesting to see attitudes towards the role of the media in getting us into Somalia and getting us into Bosnia. Will there be a difference in attitudes?)\*\*

5. The news media have a great deal of influence in establishing foreign policy. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5

(This question will test attitudes as in one, two, three, and four above. This question is not connected to history, but is asking in general if the news media have influence on establishing foreign policy. Correlations between the groups and their attitudes as in the earlier questions will be made.)\*\*

6. Technology in the future will cause the media to have an increased capability to effect foreign policy. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5

(This question departs from the past and looks for attitudes in the future. Correlations will be made between various groups such as faculty, AWC students, and various branches of the Army and services. The more conservative the lower the number?)\*\*

7. The news media and other open sources of information are of great value to the military. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5

(Question 7 and 8 below begin to explore attitudes about how useful and how much the military should use open source information.

Correlation between the attitudes, as before, with faculty, students, and branches will be made. MI related officers should clearly see the value more than the other branches. This may be a test also of the culture within the military that only thinks classified information is good and useful. These correlations may help point the leadership towards more pinpoint training of selected groups of officers.)\*\*\*

8. The news media and other open sources of information should be utilized in the future to assist military and government leaders in maintaining situational awareness. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5

(See information below question 7.)\*\*\*

9. I have often utilized media and open source information in my duties to help maintain situational awareness of overseas areas of responsibility. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5

(This question will be utilized to compare the branches, in particular MI branch. Faculty and MI should probably have a lower number than say Combat Arms officers. This question will be used to correlate earlier attitude questions with this question that asks if different groups have utilized the Media. Those that were more negative earlier should be less willing to say they utilized the media. It could be just the opposite though if they thought the Media had a very significant impact on foreign policy.)\*\*\*

#### NOTES:

\* Relates to the effect on public opinion model

\*\* Relates to the effect of the media on policy model

\*\*\* Relates to the usefulness of the media and other open sources model

Survey that was sent to the Army War College Students,

Faculty, and Selected Others below

08 November 1998

ARMY WAR COLLEGE (AWC) STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (SRP)

SURVEY

Dear AWC Classmates, Faculty, and selected others:

I am preparing a Strategy Research Project (SRP) and Shippensburg Masters paper on the media, intelligence and information proliferation. I need your help in answering a few questions (about 5 Minutes effort). All responses are confidential and voluntary. The survey contains two parts. The first part is personal data and the second contains the nine survey questions. Feel free to add any other appropriate comments.

Please return this completed survey through the distribution drop box to AWC student box number 260.

Thanks for your time and consideration! Bob Seetin/Seminar

07

Part I: Personal DATA (please use X or circle the response):

1. I am a War College ( ) student or ( ) faculty or ( ) \_\_\_\_\_.
2. I am Senior Service College Graduate ( ) Yes ( ) No.
3. If military officer or former military officer your source of commission was ( ) ROTC ( ) Academy ( ) OCS ( ) Direct
4. I am ( ) military ( ) civilian ( ) civilian (former military).
5. My Service category (civilians with no military skip to question 6)  
( ) Army ( ) Air Force ( ) Navy ( ) Marines ( ) Coast Guard
6. Army Officers (former also) give your Branch/s and specialties:  
(AV/MI...15/35 etc.) \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/.
7. Did you serve (theater/region) in either Panama, Desert Shield/Storm, Somalia, and or Bosnia operation/s? ( ) Yes ( ) No
8. I consider my political views to be ( ) very liberal ( ) moderately liberal ( ) moderate ( ) moderately conservative ( ) very conservative.

Part II: For these nine survey questions please X a number from 1 to 5. 1 strongly agree 2 agree somewhat 3 neither agree nor disagree 4 disagree somewhat 5 disagree strongly

1. The news media many times are responsible for altering public opinion. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5
2. The news media were responsible for causing the United States to commit forces in Somalia. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5
3. The news media were responsible for causing the United States to withdrawal from Somalia. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5
4. The news media were responsible for causing the United States to commit ground forces to Bosnia. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5
5. The news media have a great deal of influence in establishing foreign policy. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5
6. Technology in the future will cause the media to have an increased capability to effect foreign policy. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5
7. The news media and other open sources of information are of great value to the military. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5
8. The news media and other open sources of information should be utilized in the future to assist military and government leaders in maintaining situational awareness. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5
9. I have often utilized media and open source information in my duties to help maintain situational awareness of overseas areas of responsibility. ( )1 ( )2 ( )3 ( )4 ( )5

## SURVEY SECTION B

### FREQUENCY TABLES FROM AWC ATTITUDES SURVEY: THE MEDIA AND OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION

1. Frequency Tables (Survey Demographics Pre-modeling versions)

**Table B1**  
**Present status**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	War College Student	176	67.4	67.4	67.4
	Faculty	69	26.4	26.4	93.9
	Other	16	6.1	6.1	100.0
			29		

	Total	261	100.0	100.0	
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TABLE B1. NOTE: THE OTHER CATEGORY ABOVE IS NEARLY ALL MI OFFICERS WHO RESPONDED TO AN E-MAILED SURVEY. LATER THE MI OFFICERS WERE UTILIZED TO INCREASE MI NUMBERS FOR CROSSTABULATIONS, MULTIVARIATE CORRELATIONS, AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS. MI OFFICERS WERE NEARLY ALL BATTALION COMMANDERS OR FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS.

**Table B2**  
**SSC GRADUATE or Not**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not a graduate	189	72.4	72.4	72.4
	graduate yes	72	27.6	27.6	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B2. NOTE: SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE GRADUATES COMPARED TO NON-GRADUATES.\*\*\*\*\*

**Table B3**  
**Commission Source**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	civilian not former military	13	5.0	5.0	5.0
	ROTC	134	51.3	51.3	56.3
	Military Academy	67	25.7	25.7	82.0
	OCS	36	13.8	13.8	95.8
	Direct Commission	11	4.2	4.2	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B3. NOTE: COMMISSION SOURCE CATEGORIES WITH PURE CIVILIANS PRIOR TO COMBINING FOR CROSSTABULATIONS AND CORRELATIONS.

**Table B4**  
**Military or Civilian**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Military	230	88.1	88.1	88.1
	Civilian	14	5.4	5.4	93.5
	Civilian former military	17	6.5	6.5	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B4. NOTE: VERY FEW PURE CIVILIANS - UTILIZED LATER FOR ANALYSIS AND CORRELATIONS.

**Table B5**  
**Service Category**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Civilian no Military Time	14	5.4	5.4	5.4
	Army	212	81.2	81.2	86.6
	Air Force	17	6.5	6.5	93.1

	Navy	12	4.6	4.6	97.7
	Marine	6	2.3	2.3	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B5. NOTE: CATEGORIES COMBINED LATER FOR COMPARISONS - VERY LOW NUMBERS OF OTHER SERVICES AND PURE CIVILIANS.

**Table B6**  
**Army Branch Categories**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Civilian no military	13	5.0	5.0	5.0
	MI	34	13.0	13.0	18.0
	Combat Arms Branch	96	36.8	36.8	54.8
	Combat Support minus MI branch	30	11.5	11.5	66.3
	CSS	53	20.3	20.3	86.6
	Other Services	35	13.4	13.4	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B6. NOTE: PURE ARMY BRANCH AND OTHER SERVICES CHART PRIOR TO COMBINING FOR LATER CORRELATIONS.

**Table B7**  
**Service in Panama, DS/S, Somalia, or Bosnia (in theater)**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Did not	153	58.6	58.6	58.6
	Did	108	41.4	41.4	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B7. NOTE: SERVICE IN PANAMA, DS/S, SOMALIA, OR BOSNIA (IN THEATER)\*\*\*\*\*

**Table B8**  
**Political View**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Liberal	3	1.1	1.1	1.1
	Moderately Liberal	13	5.0	5.0	6.1
	Moderate	78	29.9	29.9	36.0
	Moderately Conservative	138	52.9	52.9	88.9
	Very Conservative	29	11.1	11.1	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B8. NOTE: RAW POLITICAL VIEW - MODERATE AND BELOW COMBINED LATER AND MODERATELY CONSERVATIVE AND VERY CONSERVATIVE COMBINED IN ORDER TO CORRELATE THE EFFECTS OF VIEW ON RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS - NEARLY 75% ABOVE THE MODERATE LEVEL.

**Table B9**  
**Faculty Vs Students**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Student	192	73.6	73.6	73.6
	Faculty	69	26.4	26.4	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B9. NOTE: RECODED FOR CORRELATION PURPOSES - NEARLY ALL OTHERS WERE MI OFFICERS ANSWERING E-MAILED SURVEY - MOST BN CDRS/FORMER BN COMMANDERS.\*\*\*\*

**Table B10**  
**Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Military	247	94.6	94.6	94.6
	Civilian	14	5.4	5.4	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B10. NOTE: RECODED FOR CORRELATION. SO FEW PURE CIVILIANS CORRELATION NOT PRACTICAL STATISTICALLY.\*\*\*\*

**Table B11**  
**Army vs All Other Branches**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Army	213	81.6	81.9	81.9
	Non Army	47	18.0	18.1	100.0
	Total	260	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.4		
Total		261	100.0		

TABLE B11. NOTE: RECODED FOR CORRELATIONS - ALL SERVICES AND CIVILIANS COMBINED TO MAKE UP NON-ARMY CATEGORY.\*\*\*\*

**Table B12**  
**MI vs All Others**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	MI	34	13.0	13.1	13.1
	All others	226	86.6	86.9	100.0
	Total	260	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.4		
Total		261	100.0		

TABLE B12. NOTE: RECODED FOR CORRELATIONS.\*\*\*\*

**Table B13**  
**Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Moderate to Very Liberal	94	36.0	36.0	36.0
	Somewhat to Very Conservative	167	64.0	64.0	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B13. NOTE: RECODED FOR CORRELATIONS.\*\*\*\*

**Table B14**  
**Academy vs. Non Academy**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Academy	67	25.7	27.1	27.1
	Non Academy	180	69.0	72.9	100.0
	Total	247	94.6	100.0	
Missing	System	14	5.4		
Total		261	100.0		

TABLE B14. NOTE: RECODED FOR COORELATIONS. MISSING DATA EQUATES TO THE CIVILIANS WITH NO FORMER MILITARY BACKGROUND.\*\*\*\*\*

## NOTE:

\*\*\*\* Recoded table utilized in later research models

\*\*\*\*\* Tables not utilized in research model analysis since they showed little to no effect

**2. Frequency Tables: Survey Question Response**  
**(General Population - Pre-model Build Versions)**

**Table B15**  
**Question one: News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	134	51.3	51.3	51.3
	agree somewhat	104	39.8	39.8	91.2
	neither agree nor disagree	11	4.2	4.2	95.4
	disagree somewhat	9	3.4	3.4	98.9
	disagree strongly	3	1.1	1.1	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B15. NOTE: (QUESTION 1) OVER 91% OF THE SURVEYED POPULATION FELT THE NEWS MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALTERING PUBLIC OPINION.\*

**Table B16**

**Question two: The news media were responsible for causing the U.S. to withdrawal from Somalia.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	46	17.6	17.6	17.6
	somewhat agree	120	46.0	46.0	63.6
	neither agree nor disagree	35	13.4	13.4	77.0
	disagree somewhat	51	19.5	19.5	96.6
	disagree strongly	9	3.4	3.4	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B16. NOTE: (QUESTION 2) OVER 69% OF THE SURVEYED POPULATION FELT THE NEWS MEDIA WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CAUSING THE U.S. TO COMMIT FORCES TO SOMALIA.\*\*

**Table B17**

**Question Three: The news media were responsible for causing the U.S. to commit ground forces to Bosnia.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	29	11.1	11.1	11.1
	agree somewhat	117	44.8	44.8	55.9
	neither agree nor disagree	52	19.9	19.9	75.9
	disagree somewhat	53	20.3	20.3	96.2
	disagree strongly	10	3.8	3.8	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B17. NOTE: (QUESTION 3) OVER 63% OF THE SURVEYED POPULATION FELT THE NEWS MEDIA WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CAUSING THE U.S. TO WITHDRAWAL FROM SOMALIA.\*\*

**Table B18**

**Question four: The news media have a great deal of influence in establishing foreign policy.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	24	9.2	9.2	9.2
	somewhat agree	135	51.7	51.7	60.9
	neither agree nor disagree	64	24.5	24.5	85.4
	disagree somewhat	34	13.0	13.0	98.5
	disagree strongly	4	1.5	1.5	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B18. NOTE: (QUESTION 4) OVER 55% OF THE SURVEYED POPULATION FELT THE NEWS MEDIA WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE U.S. COMMITMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA - STRENGTH OF NEGATIVE RESPONSE WAS LESS THAN EARLIER QUESTIONS - IN PARTICULAR SOMALIA QUESTIONS.\*\*

**Table B19**

**Question five: Technology in the future will cause the media to have an increased capability to effect foreign policy.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
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Valid	strongly agree	48	18.4	18.4	18.4
	agree somewhat	141	54.0	54.0	72.4
	neither agree nor disagree	46	17.6	17.6	90.0
	disagree somewhat	25	9.6	9.6	99.6
	disagree strongly	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B19. NOTE: (QUESTION 5) OVER 60% OF THE SURVEYED POPULATION FELT THE NEWS MEDIA HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE IN ESTABLISHING FOREIGN POLICY. THERE WAS A LOWER NEGATIVE RATING THAN IN THE FIRST THREE QUESTIONS.\*\*

**Table B20**

Question six: The news media and other open sources of information are of great value to the military.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	94	36.0	36.0	36.0
	agree somewhat	129	49.4	49.4	85.4
	neither agree nor disagree	28	10.7	10.7	96.2
	disagree somewhat	10	3.8	3.8	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B20. NOTE: (QUESTION 6) OVER 72% OF THE GENERAL SURVEY POPULATION FELT TECHNOLOGY WILL CAUSE THE MEDIA TO HAVE AN INCREASED CAPABILITY TO EFFECT FOREIGN POLICY. THE SUVEYED POPULATION CONSISTANTLY CREDIT THE MEDIA WITH A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE AND POWER.\*\*

Question seven: The news media and other open sources of information are of great value to the military.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	94	36.0	36.0	36.0
	agree somewhat	129	49.4	49.4	85.4
	neither agree nor disagree	28	10.7	10.7	96.2
	disagree somewhat	10	3.8	3.8	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B21. NOTE: (QUESTION 7) VERY STRONG GENERAL SURVEYED POPULATION RESPONSES. 86% FELT NEWS MEDIA AND OTHER OPEN SOURCES ARE OF GREAT VALUE TO THE MILITARY.\*\*\*

**Table B22**

Question eight: The news media and other open sources of information should be utilized in the future to assist military and government leaders in maintaining situational awareness.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	103	39.5	39.5	39.5
	somewhat agree	131	50.2	50.2	89.7
	neither agree nor disagree	20	7.7	7.7	97.3
	disagree somewhat	6	2.3	2.3	99.6

disagree strongly	1	.4	.4	100.0
Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B22. NOTE: (QUESTION 8) 89% OF THE GENERAL SURVEYED POPULATION FELT THE NEWS MEDIA AND OTHER OPEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE UTILIZED IN THE FUTURE TO MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.\*\*\*

**Table B23**

Question nine: I have often utilized media and open source information in my duties to help maintain situational awareness of overseas areas of responsibility.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	88	33.7	33.7	33.7
	agree somewhat	95	36.4	36.4	70.1
	neither agree nor disagree	45	17.2	17.2	87.4
	disagree somewhat	24	9.2	9.2	96.6
	disagree strongly	9	3.4	3.4	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

TABLE B23. NOTE: (QUESTION 9) MUCH OF THE GENERAL SURVEYED POPULATION (70%) HAVE UTILIZED THE MEDIA AND OPEN SOURCES TO ASSIST THEM IN THERE DUTIES TO HELP MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF OVERSEAS AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.\*\*\*

**NOTE:**

- \* Later used for the effects of the media on public opinion model
- \*\* Later combined and used in the media's effects on foreign policy model
- \*\*\* Later combined and used in the usefulness of the media and open

**3. Frequency Tables (Descriptive Statistics - Pre-modeling version)**

**Table B24**  
**Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation
present status	261	1.00	3.00	1.3870	.6010
SSC GRADUATE or Not	261	.00	1.00	.2759	.4478
Commission Source	261	.00	4.00	1.6092	.9326
Military or Civilian	261	1.00	3.00	1.1839	.5305
Service Category	261	.00	4.00	1.1724	.6940
Army Branch Categories	261	.00	5.00	2.6935	1.4108
Service in Panama, DS/S, Somalia, or Bosnia (in theater)	261	.00	1.00	.4138	.4935
Political View	261	1.00	5.00	3.6782	.7819
Faculty Vs. Students	261	1.00	2.00	1.2644	.4418
Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	261	1.00	2.00	1.0536	.2257
Army vs All Other Branches	260	1.00	2.00	1.1808	.3856
MI vs All Others	260	1.00	2.00	1.8692	.3378
Political View - Liberal to Moderate vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	261	1.00	2.00	1.6398	.4810
Academy vs. Non Academy	247	1.00	2.00	1.7287	.4455
News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion.	261	1.00	5.00	1.6322	.8150
The news media were responsible for causing the U.S. to commit forces in Somalia	261	1.00	5.00	2.2644	1.0465
The news media were responsible for causing the U.S. to withdrawal from Somalia.	261	1.00	5.00	2.4521	1.0966
The news media were responsible for causing the U.S. to	261	1.00	5.00	2.6092	1.0491

commit ground forces to Bosnia.					
The news media have a great deal of influence in establishing foreign policy.	261	1.00	5.00	2.4598	.8876
Technology in the future will cause the media to have an increased capability to effect foreign policy.	261	1.00	5.00	2.1954	.8616
The news media and other open sources of information are of great value to the military.	261	1.00	4.00	1.8238	.7693
The news media and other open sources of information should be utilized in the future to assist military and government leaders in maintaining situational awareness.	261	1.00	5.00	1.7395	.7293
I have often utilized media and open source information in my duties to help maintain situational awareness of overseas areas of responsibility.	261	1.00	5.00	2.1226	1.0850
Valid N (listwise)	247				

TABLE B24. NOTE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS PRIOR TO MODELING

## SURVEY SECTION C

### Summary of the Three Key Research Models

In the first part of this section are the Frequency tables, and Descriptive Statistics (C1-9) for the five modified independent variables (C1-5) and three research model questions or dependant variables ((q1=model 1) - (q2,q3,q4,q5,q6= model 2) - (q7,q8,q9=model 3)).

### **Research Model Frequency Tables**

Table C1

#### Faculty vs. Students

Ind Variable 1		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Student	192	73.6	73.6	73.6
	Faculty	69	26.4	26.4	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

Table C2

#### **Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)**

Ind Variable 2		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Military	247	94.6	94.6	94.6
	Civilian	14	5.4	5.4	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

Table C3

#### **Army vs All Other Branches**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
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Ind Variable 3					
Valid	Army	213	81.6	81.9	81.9
	Non Army	47	18.0	18.1	100.0
	Total	260	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.4		
Total		261	100.0		

**Table C4**  
**MI vs All Others**

Ind Variable 4		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	MI	34	13.0	13.1	13.1
	All others	226	86.6	86.9	100.0
	Total	260	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.4		
Total		261	100.0		

**Table C5**  
**Political View - Liberal to Moderate vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.**

Ind Variable 5		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Moderate to Very Liberal	94	36.0	36.0	36.0
	Somewhat to Very Conservative	167	64.0	64.0	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

**Table C6**  
**News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion.**

Model 1		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	134	51.3	51.3	51.3
	agree somewhat	104	39.8	39.8	91.2
	neither agree nor disagree	11	4.2	4.2	95.4
	disagree somewhat	9	3.4	3.4	98.9
	disagree strongly	3	1.1	1.1	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

**Table C7**  
**The Media's Effect on Foreign Policy - Past - Present - Future.**

Model 2		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	5	1.9	1.9	1.9
	Agree Somewhat	95	36.4	36.4	38.3
	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	113	43.3	43.3	81.6

Disagree Somewhat	42	16.1	16.1	97.7
Disagree Strongly	6	2.3	2.3	100.0
Total	261	100.0	100.0	

**Table C8**

The Value of the Media and Open Source - The Military  
Should use and I have used in the Past.

Model 3		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	44	16.9	16.9	16.9
	Agree Somewhat	142	54.4	54.4	71.3
	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	69	26.4	26.4	97.7
	Disagree Somewhat	6	2.3	2.3	100.0
	Total	261	100.0	100.0	

**Table C9**  
Descriptive Statistics

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean
Faculty vs. Students	261	1.00	1.00	2.00	330.0 0	1.2644
Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	261	1.00	1.00	2.00	275.0 0	1.0536
Army vs All Other Branches	260	1.00	1.00	2.00	307.0 0	1.1808
MI vs All Others	260	1.00	1.00	2.00	486.0 0	1.8692
Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	261	1.00	1.00	2.00	428.0 0	1.6398
News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion.	261	4.00	1.00	5.00	426.0 0	1.6322
The Media's Effect on Foreign Policy - Past - Present - Future.	261	4.00	1.00	5.00	732.0 0	2.8046
The Value of the Media and Open Source - The Military Should Use and I have used in the Past.	261	3.00	1.00	4.00	559.0 0	2.1418
Valid N (listwise)	260					

Tables C1 through C5 show the number and percentage  
breakouts for each group that was used for the three research  
models (Independent Variables). As you can see above in table  
C1 for instance 26.4 percent of the surveyed population were  
faculty while 73.6 percent were students. There were 261 cases  
or respondents to the survey being utilized in analyzing the  
three research models. The only other thing worth mentioning is

the low percentage, table two, of pure civilians, and table C4, 13.1 percent for MI officers.

Tables C6 through C8 are research model questions (Dependant Variables) one through three. The first question, table C6, shows the general surveyed population agree somewhat and strongly agree at a rate of 91.2 percent. They attribute a great deal of power to the media in altering public opinion. Table C7, only shows 38.3 percent of the general population attribute that same type of power by the media to the effect on foreign policy. Table C8, shows the general population considers the media and open source material to be very valuable and should be utilized by the military (71.3 percent). Table C9 is a list of descriptive statistics for all independent and dependant variables.

#### Research Model Number One

Below in research model number one a Bivariate Cross-Tabulation correlation<sup>22</sup>, and Multiple Regression<sup>23</sup> analyses will be run and summarized for research model question number one using the five independent variables listed in table number C1 to C5. The null hypothesis for each pair would be that each sample group in tables C1 to C5, answers the questions the same as each of the others. They would agree or disagree with the dependant variable question at the same rate. In other words

for instance, Faculty will respond the same as the students when questioned about the effect of the media on public opinion.

The research hypothesis for table C1 would be that students would more strongly agree the media effects public opinion at a greater rate than the faculty. In the case of table C2, the military will have a stronger agreement rate than the civilians. Army would agree stronger than non-Army (table C3). Others should more strongly agree with the statement than MI officers (table C4) should, while the more conservative will agree that the media at a greater rate than the more liberal (table C5) effects public opinion.

**Research Model Number 1: News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion. (Dep Var) \* Faculty vs. Students (Ind Var)**

**Table C-10**

**Cross-tab**

Model 1		Faculty Vs. Students		Total
		Student	Faculty	
strongly agree	Count	102	32	134
	% within Faculty Vs. Students	53.1%	46.4%	51.3%
	% of Total	39.1%	12.3%	51.3%
agree somewhat	Count	78	26	104
	% within Faculty Vs. Students	40.6%	37.7%	39.8%
	% of Total	29.9%	10.0%	39.8%
neither agree nor disagree	Count	7	4	11
	% within Faculty Vs. Students	3.6%	5.8%	4.2%
	% of Total	2.7%	1.5%	4.2%
disagree somewhat	Count	5	4	9
	% within Faculty Vs. Students	2.6%	5.8%	3.4%
	% of Total	1.9%	1.5%	3.4%
disagree strongly	Count		3	3
	% within Faculty Vs. Students		4.3%	1.1%
	% of Total		1.1%	1.1%
Count		192	69	261
% within Faculty Vs. Students		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

	% of Total	73.6%	26.4%	100.0%
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### Symmetric Measures

Model 1		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	<u>Gamma</u>	.188	.123	1.470	.141
	Spearman Correlation	.096	.065	1.545	.123 (c)
Interval by Interval	<u>Pearson's R</u>	.154	.069	2.501	.013 (c)
N of Valid Cases		261			

a Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c Based on normal approximation.

Table C10: Note: Weak positive direction with a Gamma of .188 and Pearson's R of .154. Pearson's R is significant at the .01% level (.013%). (Gamma/Pearson's R -1 to + 1 Maximum) The students more strongly agree than Faculty (See top table).

### Table C11

#### Cross-tab

Research Model Number 1: News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion.(Dep Var) (Ind Var)\* Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)

Model 1		<u>Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)</u>		Total
		Military	Civilian	
strongly agree	Count	127	7	134
	<u>% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)</u>	51.4%	50.0%	51.3%
	% of Total	48.7%	2.7%	51.3%
agree somewhat	Count	99	5	104
	<u>% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)</u>	40.1%	35.7%	39.8%
	% of Total	37.9%	1.9%	39.8%
neither agree nor disagree	Count	11		11
	<u>% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)</u>	4.5%		4.2%
	% of Total	4.2%		4.2%
disagree somewhat	Count	8	1	9
	<u>% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)</u>	3.2%	7.1%	3.4%
	% of Total	3.1%	.4%	3.4%
disagree strongly	Count	2	1	3
	<u>% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)</u>	.8%	7.1%	1.1%
	% of Total	.8%	.4%	1.1%
Count		247	14	261
<u>% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)</u>		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

	% of Total	94.6%	5.4%	100.0%
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### Symmetric Measures

Model 1		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.082	.252	.320	.749
	Spearman Correlation	.021	.067	.345	.730 (c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.066	.088	1.062	.289 (c)
N of Valid Cases		261			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					
c Based on normal approximation.					

Table C11: Note: Insignificant Result - Weak positive direction. Gamma (.082) and Pearson's R (.066) -Statistically not significant. Can not reject the Null Hypothesis. Chances of getting this result randomly are much greater than .01/.05%.

**Table C12**

### Cross-tab

**Research Model Number 1: News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion.(Dep Var) (Ind Var)\* MI vs All Others**

Model 1		MI VS ALL OTHERS		Total
		MI	ALL OTHERS	
strongly agree	Count	19	115	134
	% within MI Vs All Others	55.9%	50.9%	51.5%
	% of Total	7.3%	44.2%	51.5%
agree somewhat	Count	13	91	104
	% within MI Vs All Others	38.2%	40.3%	40.0%
	% of Total	5.0%	35.0%	40.0%
neither agree nor disagree	Count	1	10	11
	% within MI Vs All Others	2.9%	4.4%	4.2%
	% of Total	.4%	3.8%	4.2%
disagree somewhat	Count	1	7	8
	% within MI Vs All Others	2.9%	3.1%	3.1%
	% of Total	.4%	2.7%	3.1%
disagree strongly	Count		3	3
	% within MI Vs All Others		1.3%	1.2%
	% of Total		1.2%	1.2%
	Count	34	226	260
		13.1%	86.9%	100.0%
	% within MI Vs All Others	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	13.1%	86.9%	100.0%

### Symmetric Measures

Model 1		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.108	.167	.655	.513
	Spearman Correlation	.040	.060	.636	.526 (c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.045	.055	.729	.467 (c)
N of Valid Cases		260			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					
c Based on normal approximation.					

Table C12: Note: Insignificant Result - Weak positive direction. Gamma (.108) and Pearson's R (.045) -Statistically not significant. Can not reject the Null Hypothesis. Chances of getting this result randomly are much greater than .01/.05%.

**Table C13**

### Cross-tab

**Research Model Number 1: News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion.(Dep Var) (Ind Var) \* Army vs All Other Branches**

Model 1		<u>Army Vs All Other Branches</u>		Total
		<u>Army</u>	<u>Non Army</u>	
strongly agree	Count	112	22	134
	<u>% within Army Vs All Other Branches</u>	<u>52.6%</u>	<u>46.8%</u>	51.5%
	% of Total	43.1%	8.5%	51.5%
agree somewhat	Count	83	21	104
	<u>% within Army Vs All Other Branches</u>	<u>39.0%</u>	<u>44.7%</u>	40.0%
	% of Total	31.9%	8.1%	40.0%
neither agree nor disagree	Count	10	1	11
	<u>% within Army Vs All Other Branches</u>	<u>4.7%</u>	<u>2.1%</u>	4.2%
	% of Total	3.8%	.4%	4.2%
disagree somewhat	Count	6	2	8
	<u>% within Army Vs All Other Branches</u>	<u>2.8%</u>	<u>4.3%</u>	3.1%
	% of Total	2.3%	.8%	3.1%
disagree strongly	Count	2	1	3
	<u>% within Army Vs All Other Branches</u>	<u>.9%</u>	<u>2.1%</u>	1.2%
	% of Total	.8%	.4%	1.2%
	Count	213	47	260
		81.9%	18.1%	100.0%
	<u>% within Army Vs All Other Branches</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	100.0%
	% of Total	81.9%	18.1%	100.0%

### Symmetric Measures

Model 1	Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
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Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.096	.142	.667	.505
	Spearman Correlation	.041	.062	.666	.506 (c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.046	.066	.745	.457 (c)
N of Valid Cases		260			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					
c Based on normal approximation.					

Table C13: Note: Insignificant Result - Weak positive direction. Gamma (.096) and Pearson's R (.046) -Statistically not significant. Can not reject the Null Hypothesis. Chances of getting this result randomly are much greater than .01/.05%.

**Table C14**

Cross-tab

**Research Model Number 1: News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion.(Dep Var) (Ind Var)\* Political View - Liberal to Moderate vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.**

Model 1		Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.		Total
		Moderate to Very Liberal	Somewhat to Very Conservative	
strongly agree	Count	38	96	134
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	40.4%	57.5%	51.3%
	% of Total	14.6%	36.8%	51.3%
agree somewhat	Count	43	61	104
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	45.7%	36.5%	39.8%
	% of Total	16.5%	23.4%	39.8%
neither agree nor disagree	Count	5	6	11
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	5.3%	3.6%	4.2%
	% of Total	1.9%	2.3%	4.2%
disagree somewhat	Count	8	1	9
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	8.5%	.6%	3.4%
	% of Total	3.1%	.4%	3.4%
disagree strongly	Count		3	3
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.		100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		1.1%	1.1%
	Count	94	167	261
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	36.0%	64.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	36.0%	64.0%	100.0%

### Symmetric Measures

Model 1		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	<u>Gamma</u>	<u>-.324</u>	.104	<u>-2.911</u>	<u>.004</u>
	Spearman Correlation	-.180	.061	-2.948	.003 (c)
Interval by Interval	<u>Pearson's R</u>	<u>-.172</u>	.064	<u>-2.817</u>	<u>.005 (c)</u>
N of Valid Cases		261			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					
c Based on normal approximation.					

Table C14: Note: Moderate Result. - Moderate Negative direction. Gamma (-.324) and Pearson's R (-.172) -Statistically significant. The Null Hypothesis is rejected. The chances of getting this result randomly are less than .01%. The more conservative agreed at a higher rate than liberals did. The top part of the table shows 57% to 40% strongly agree and the correlation can be followed viewing the chart above.

### Table C15

#### Cross-tab

#### Research Model Number 1: News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion.(Dep Var)

#### MULTIPLE REGRESSION

#### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.224 (a)	.050	.031	.7905
a Predictors: (Constant), Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative., Army Vs All Other Branches , Faculty Vs. Students, MI Vs All Others, Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)				

#### ANOVA (b)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	8.356	5	1.671	2.675	.022 (a)
	Residual	158.705	254	.625		
	Total	167.062	259			
a Predictors: (Constant), Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative., Army Vs All Other Branches , Faculty Vs. Students, MI Vs All Others, Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)						
b Dependent Variable: News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion.						

#### Coefficients (a)

Model 1		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
Ind Variabl es	(Constant)	1.554	.414		3.749	.000
	(1) Faculty Vs. Students	.265	.112	.145	2.370	.019

(2) Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	-.01090	.251	-.003	-.043	.965		
(3) Army Vs All Other Branches	.07584	.145	.036	.524	.600		
(4) MI Vs All Others	.06417	.148	.027	.433	.666		
(5) Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	-.282	.103	-.169	-2.752	.006		
a Dependent Variable: News media many times are responsible for altering public opinion.							

**Table C15: NOTE: Model (1) Multiple Regression :**

The R square (model summary) is only five percent (.05%) indicating that the five independent variables only account for 5% of the variation in the dependant variable result. The independent variables have a weak relationship overall. ANOVA (analysis of variance): The F statistic is significant (2.675), indicating that the simultaneous test that each coefficient is 0 (same response) is rejected. The fact that the associated probability (Sig) is so small (0.022) does not imply that each of the independent variables makes a meaningful contribution to the fit of the model. (Coefficients: Note: The independent Variables are labeled 1 to 5 above) Independent variable 1 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement (ID) there is only a .265 unit of movement in the dependant variable (B column). The statistical t above is 2.370 and shows a significance level of .019. Variable 1 shows less than a 5% chance of getting this result randomly. Independent Variable 2 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement (ID) there is only a -.0109 unit of movement in the dependant variable (B column). The statistical t is only -.043 and shows a significance level of .965. This result indicates a great deal of chance in getting this result (much greater than 10%). Independent Variable 3 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement (ID) there is only .07584 units of movement in the dependant variable (B column). The statistical t is only .524 and shows a significance level of .600. This result indicates a great deal of chance in getting this result (much greater than 10%). Independent Variable 4 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement (ID) there is only a .06417 unit of movement in the dependant variable (B column). The statistical t is only .433 and shows a significance level of .666. This result indicates a great deal of chance in getting this result (much greater than 10%). Independent variable 5 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement (ID) there is only a .282 unit of movement in the dependant variable (B column). The statistical t above is -2.752 and shows a significance level of .006. Variable 1 shows less than a 1% chance of getting this result randomly.

**Summary of Research Model Number One:** There is nothing significant about table C9 through C12 using a Gamma formula. They show that the null hypothesis can not be rejected for the first four independent variables, although in table C10 using Pearson's R it is significant at the 1 percent level. The results could have been found randomly in the general Army War College Population. The only null hypothesis we can reject using a Gamma formula alone is the

one connected with the political views of the surveyed population.

Table 13 shows a gamma correlation that is moderately negative ( $-.324$ ) and is significant at the 1 percent level. In other words the null hypothesis is rejected. In statistical terms the more Conservative one is the more likely the chances of strongly agreeing with the premise that the media has a great deal of influence on public opinion. Chances of getting this result randomly within the general Army War College population is less than one percent.

The Multiple regression table C15 shows that the R square is only five percent (5 percent) indicating that the five independent variables only account for 5 percent of the result. The independent variables have a weak relationship overall. The only part of the table that is of interest besides the R squared result is the fact that the statistical T obtained in independent variable 1 is 2.370 with a significance of level of 5% and independent variable 5 with  $-2.752$  and 1 percent respectfully. It displayed again that students and faculty look at the media's effect on public opinion differently, as do those that are more conservative.

Clearly from the earlier general population frequency tables it was apparent that the Army War College population, credits the media with a great deal of power to influence public opinion and the only groups that stand out statistically are those that considered themselves more conservative than liberal, and faculty. Faculty and liberals do not credit the media with as much power to effect public opinion, as do others.

**Research Model Number Two:**

Below in research model number two a Bivariate Cross-Tabulation correlation, and Multiple Regression analyses will be run and summarized on question number two (dependant variable) using the five independent variables listed in table number C1 to C5. The null hypothesis for this research model is that each sample group in tables 1 to 5 answer the questions the same. They agreed or disagreed with the dependant variable question number two at the same level. In other words for instance, Faculty will respond the same as the students when questioned about the effect of the media on establishing foreign policy.

The research hypothesis for table C1 would be that students would more strongly agree that the media effects foreign policy. That agreement should be at a greater rate than the faculty. In the case of table C2, the military will have a stronger

agreement rate than the civilians. Army would agree stronger than non-Army (table C3). Others should more strongly agree with the statement than MI officers (table C4), while the more conservative the more likely they would agree that foreign policy is effected by the media at a greater rate than liberals (table C5).

**Table C16**

**Cross-tab**

**Research Model number two: Effect of the Media Past-Present-Future on Foreign Policy (Dep Var)\* (Ind Var) Faculty vs. Students**

Model 2		Faculty Vs. Students		Total
		Student	Faculty	
Strongly agree	Count	5		5
	% within Faculty Vs. Students	2.6%		1.9%
	% of Total	1.9%		1.9%
Agree Somewhat	Count	71	24	95
	% within Faculty Vs. Students	37.0%	34.8%	36.4%
	% of Total	27.2%	9.2%	36.4%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Count	86	27	113
	% within Faculty Vs. Students	44.8%	39.1%	43.3%
	% of Total	33.0%	10.3%	43.3%
Disagree Somewhat	Count	28	14	42
	% within Faculty Vs. Students	14.6%	20.3%	16.1%
	% of Total	10.7%	5.4%	16.1%
Disagree Strongly	Count	2	4	6
	% within Faculty Vs. Students	1.0%	5.8%	2.3%
	% of Total	.8%	1.5%	2.3%
Total	Count	192	69	261
	% within Faculty Vs. Students	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	73.6%	26.4%	100.0%

**Symmetric Measures**

Model 2		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.179	.114	1.534	.125
	Spearman Correlation	.098	.063	1.581	.115 (c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.123	.064	1.999	.047 (c)
N of Valid Cases		261			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					

c Based on normal approximation.

Table C16: Note: Weak Result. - Weak Positive direction - Gamma (.179) and Pearson's R (.123) - Statistically the Pearson's R is significant. The Null Hypothesis is rejected. The chances of getting this result randomly are less than .05%. Although it is weak the students agreed at a higher rate than liberals did. The top part of the table shows faculty in fact disagreeing somewhat and strongly at a higher rate than students (20 to 14 and 1 to 5 %s). The correlation can be followed viewing the chart above.

**Table C17**

**Cross-tab**

**Research Model number two: Effect of the Media Past-Present-Future on Foreign Policy (Dep Var)\* (Ind Var)\* Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)**

Model 2		Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)		Total
		Military	Civilian	
Strongly agree	Count	5		5
	% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	2.0%		1.9%
	% of Total	1.9%		1.9%
Agree Somewhat	Count	91	4	95
	% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	36.8%	28.6%	36.4%
	% of Total	34.9%	1.5%	36.4%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Count	110	3	113
	% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	44.5%	21.4%	43.3%
	% of Total	42.1%	1.1%	43.3%
Disagree Somewhat	Count	37	5	42
	% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	15.0%	35.7%	16.1%
	% of Total	14.2%	1.9%	16.1%
Disagree Strongly	Count	4	2	6
	% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	1.6%	14.3%	2.3%
	% of Total	1.5%	.8%	2.3%
Total	Count	247	14	261
	% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	94.6%	5.4%	100.0%

**Symmetric Measures**

Model 2		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.419	.210	1.679	.093
	Spearman Correlation	.131	.072	2.120	.035 (c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.163	.079	2.650	.009 (c)
N of Valid Cases		261			

a Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c Based on normal approximation.

Table C17: Note: Weak to moderate Result. - Moderate Positive direction - Gamma (.419) and Pearson's R (.163) - The Pearson's R is statistically significant. The Null Hypothesis is rejected. The chances of obtaining this result randomly are less than .01%. Although it is weak the military agreed at a higher rate than civilians did. The top part of the table shows military agreeing somewhat stronger. The correlation can be followed viewing the chart above.

**Table C18**

**Cross-tab**

**Research Model number two: Effect of the Media Past-Present-Future on Foreign Policy (Dep Var)\* (Ind Var)\* Army vs All Other Branches**

Model 2		Army Vs All Other Branches		Total
		Army	Non Army	
Strongly agree	Count	4	1	5
	% within Army Vs All Other Branches	1.9%	2.1%	1.9%
	% of Total	1.5%	.4%	1.9%
Agree Somewhat	Count	82	13	95
	% within Army Vs All Other Branches	38.5%	27.7%	36.5%
	% of Total	31.5%	5.0%	36.5%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Count	90	23	113
	% within Army Vs All Other Branches	42.3%	48.9%	43.5%
	% of Total	34.6%	8.8%	43.5%
Disagree Somewhat	Count	33	8	41
	% within Army Vs All Other Branches	15.5%	17.0%	15.8%
	% of Total	12.7%	3.1%	15.8%
Disagree Strongly	Count	4	2	6
	% within Army Vs All Other Branches	1.9%	4.3%	2.3%
	% of Total	1.5%	.8%	2.3%
Total	Count	213	47	260
	% within Army Vs All Other Branches	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	81.9%	18.1%	100.0%

**Symmetric Measures**

Model 2		Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.169	.128	1.291	.197
	Spearman Correlation	.080	.061	1.284	.200(c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.079	.064	1.276	.203(c)

N of Valid Cases	260			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.				
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.				
c Based on normal approximation.				

Table C18: Note: Insignificant Result - Weak positive Gamma (.169) and Pearson's R (.079) -Statistically not significant. Can not reject the Null Hypothesis. Chances of getting this result randomly are much greater than .01/.05%.

**Table C19**

**Cross-tab**

**Research Model number two: Effect of the Media Past-Present -Future on Foreign Policy (Dep Var)\* (Ind Var)\* MI vs All Others**

Model 2		MI Vs All Others		Total
		MI	All others	
Strongly agree	Count	2	3	5
	% within MI Vs All Others	5.9%	1.3%	1.9%
	% of Total	.8%	1.2%	1.9%
Agree Somewhat	Count	16	79	95
	% within MI Vs All Others	47.1%	35.0%	36.5%
	% of Total	6.2%	30.4%	36.5%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Count	10	103	113
	% within MI Vs All Others	29.4%	45.6%	43.5%
	% of Total	3.8%	39.6%	43.5%
Disagree Somewhat	Count	4	37	41
	% within MI Vs All Others	11.8%	16.4%	15.8%
	% of Total	1.5%	14.2%	15.8%
Disagree Strongly	Count	2	4	6
	% within MI Vs All Others	5.9%	1.8%	2.3%
	% of Total	.8%	1.5%	2.3%
Total	Count	34	226	260
	% within MI Vs All Others	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	13.1%	86.9%	100.0%

**Symmetric Measures**

Model 2		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.215	.159	1.337	.181
	Spearman Correlation	.092	.068	1.481	.140 (c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.073	.073	1.183	.238 (c)
N of Valid Cases		260			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					
c Based on normal approximation.					

Table C19: Note: Insignificant Result - Weak positive direction. Gamma (.215) and Pearson's R (.073) -Statistically not significant. Can not reject the Null Hypothesis. Chances of getting this result randomly are much greater than .01/.05%.

**Table C20**

**Cross-tab**

**Research Model number two: Effect of the Media Past-Present -Future on Foreign Policy (Dep Var)\* (Ind Var)\* Political View - Liberal to Moderate vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.**

Model 2		Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.		Total
		Moderate to Very Liberal	Somewhat to Very Conservative	
Strongly agree	Count	1	4	5
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	1.1%	2.4%	1.9%
	% of Total	.4%	1.5%	1.9%
Agree Somewhat	Count	24	71	95
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	25.5%	42.5%	36.4 %
	% of Total	9.2%	27.2%	36.4 %
Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Count	42	71	113
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	44.7%	42.5%	43.3 %
	% of Total	16.1%	27.2%	43.3 %
Disagree Somewhat	Count	25	17	42
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	26.6%	10.2%	16.1 %
	% of Total	9.6%	6.5%	16.1 %
Disagree Strongly	Count	2	4	6
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	2.1%	2.4%	2.3%
	% of Total	.8%	1.5%	2.3%
Total	Count	94	167	261
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	36.0%	64.0%	100.0%

**Symmetric Measures**

Model 2		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	-.366	.095	-3.637	.000
	Spearman Correlation	-.220	.060	-3.632	.000 (c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	-.211	.061	-3.468	.001 (c)
N of Valid Cases		261			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					

c Based on normal approximation.

Table C20: Note: Moderate Result. - Moderate Negative Direction - Gamma (-.366) and Pearson's R (-.211) -Statistically significant. The Null Hypothesis is rejected. The chances of getting this result randomly is less than .01% for either correlation (Gamma, Pearson's R). The more conservative agreed at a higher rate than liberals did. The correlation can be followed viewing the chart above.

**Table C21**

**Cross-tab**

**Multiple-Regression Analysis**

**Model Summary**

Model	R	R SQUARE	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
2	.311 (a)	.097	.079	3.6705

a Predictors: (Constant), Political View - Liberal to Moderate vs Somewhat to Very Conservative., Army vs All Other Branches , Faculty Vs. Students, MI vs All Others, Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)

**ANOVA (b)**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
2	Regression	366.233	5	73.247	5.437	.000 (a)
	Residual	3422.117	254	13.473		
	Total	3788.350	259			

a Predictors: (Constant), Political View - Liberal to Moderate vs Somewhat to Very Conservative., Army vs All Other Branches , Faculty Vs. Students, MI vs All Others, Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)

b Dependent Variable: Effect of the Media Past-Present-Future on Foreign Policy

**Coefficients (a)**

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.		
Model 2		B	Std. Error	Beta				
Ind Variabl es	(Constant)	9.939	1.924		5.165	.000		
	(1) FACULTY VS. STUDENTS	1.396	.520	.161	2.686	.008		
	(2) Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	2.364	1.166	.135	2.027	.044		
	(3) Army vs All Other Branches	.187	.671	.019	.278	.781		
	(4) MI vs All Others	.263	.689	.023	.382	.703		
	(5) Political View - Liberal to Moderate vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	-1.793	.476	-.225	-3.767	.000		

a Dependent Variable: Effect of the Media Past-Present-Future on Foreign Policy

**Table C21: NOTE: Model (2) Multiple Regression:**

The R square (model summary) is only nine point seven (.097%) indicating that the five independent variables only account for 9.7% of the variation in the dependant variable result. The independent variables have a weak relationship overall. ANOVA (analysis of variance): The F statistic is significant (5.437), indicating that the simultaneous test that each coefficient is 0 (same response) is rejected. The fact that the associated probability (Sig) is so small (0.000) does not imply that each of the independent variables makes a meaningful contribution to the fit of the model.

(Coefficients: Note: The independent Variables are labeled 1 to 5 above) Independent variable 1 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement there is a 1.396 unit of movement in the dependent variable (B column). The statistical t above is 2.686 and shows a significance level of .000. Variable 1 shows less than a 1% chance of getting this result randomly. Independent Variable 2 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement there is a 2.364 unit of movement in the dependent variable (B column). The statistical t is 2.027 and shows a significance level of .044. Variable 2 shows less than a 5% chance of getting this result randomly. Independent Variable 3 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement there is only .187 unit of movement in the dependant variable (B column). The statistical t is only .278 and shows a significance level of .781. This result indicates a great deal of chance in getting this result (much greater than 10%). Independent Variable 4 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement there is only a .263 unit of movement in the dependent variable (B column). The statistical t is only .382 and shows a significance level of .703. This result indicates a great deal of chance in getting this result (much greater than 10%). Independent variable 5 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement there is only a -1.793 unit of movement in the dependent variable (B column). The statistical t above is -3.767 and shows a significance level of .000. Variable 1 shows less than a 1% chance of getting this result randomly.

Summary of Research Model Number two: There is little very significance in the results in tables C16-19. Although, using Pearson's R there is a weak to moderate positive relationship between students and faculty and military and civilians (Ind Variable 1 and 2: C16,17). Using Pearson's R you can reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent and 1 percent level. Table C18 and 19 (Ind Variable 3 and 4) more clearly shows that the null hypothesis can not be rejected for these independent variables. The results could have been found randomly in the general Army War College Population. The only null hypothesis we can reject easily using the Gamma formula is the one connected with the political views of the surveyed population (Ind Variable 5).

Table C20, shows a gamma correlation that is moderately negative (-.366) and is significant at the .018 level. In other words the null hypothesis is rejected. In statistical terms the more Conservative one is the more likely the chance of strongly agreeing with the premise that the media has a great deal of

influence on effecting foreign policy. Chances of getting this result randomly within the general Army War College population is less than five percent (5 percent).

The Multiple regression table, C21, shows that the R square is only nine point seven percent (9.7 percent) indicating that the five independent variables only account for 9.7 percent of the result. The independent variables have a weak relationship overall. An interesting area besides the R square result is the significance level of variable 1, 2, and 5. The statistical T obtained in independent variable 1 is 2.686 with a significance of level of 1%, variable 2 is 2.027 with a significance of level of 5%, and independent variable 5 with -3.767 with a significance level of 1% respectfully. It displayed again that students and faculty look at the media's effect on foreign policy differently, as do pure civilians and military, as do those that are more conservative than liberal.

Clearly from the earlier general population frequency tables it was apparent that the general Army War College population credits the media with a great deal of power to effect foreign policy, but less than effect public opinion. Again the only groups that stood-out statistically are those that considered themselves more conservative than liberal, faculty, and pure civilians.

**Research Model Number Three:**

Below in research model number three a Bivariate Cross-Tabulation correlation, and Multiple Regression analyses will be run and summarized on question number three (dependant variable) using the five independent variables listed in table number C1 to C5. The null hypothesis for this research model is that each of the groups in tables C1 to C5 will answer the question the same. They agreed or disagreed with the dependant variable question number three at the same level. In other words for instance, faculty will respond the same as the students when questioned about the value and usefulness of the media.

The research hypothesis for table C1 would be that students would more strongly agree that the media is useful due to their recent experience in the field. That agreement should be at a greater rate than the faculty. In the case of table C2, the military will have a stronger agreement rate than the civilians. Army would agree stronger than non-Army (table C3). MI officers should more strongly agree with the statement than Others (table C4), while the more conservative the more likely they would disagree that the media is useful at a greater rate than liberals (table C5).

#### Table C22

#### Cross-tab

**Research Model Number 3: Value of the Media and Open source - The Military Should Use and I have used in the past.(Dep Var) \* (Ind Var)Faculty vs. Students**

Model 3			Faculty Vs. Students		Total
			Student	Faculty	
Strongly Agree	Count		29	15	44
	% within Faculty Vs. Students		15.1%	21.7%	16.9%
	% of Total		11.1%	5.7%	16.9%
Agree Somewhat	Count		103	39	142
	% within Faculty Vs. Students		53.6%	56.5%	54.4%
	% of Total		39.5%	14.9%	54.4%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Count		56	13	69
	% within Faculty Vs. Students		29.2%	18.8%	26.4%
	% of Total		21.5%	5.0%	26.4%
Disagree Somewhat	Count		4	2	6
	% within Faculty Vs. Students		2.1%	2.9%	2.3%
	% of Total		1.5%	.8%	2.3%
Total	Count		192	69	261
	% within Faculty Vs. Students		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		73.6%	26.4%	100.0%

**Symmetric Measures**

Model 3		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	-.200	.118	-1.670	.095
	Spearman Correlation	-.103	.061	-1.667	.097 (c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	-.095	.063	-1.538	.125 (c)
N of Valid Cases		261			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					
c Based on normal approximation.					

Table C22: Note: Insignificant Result - Weak negative direction Gamma (-.200) and Pearson's R (-.0953) -Statistically not significant. Can not reject the Null Hypothesis. Chances of getting this result randomly are much greater than .01/.05%.

**Table C23**

**Cross-tab**

**Research Model Number 3: Value of the Media and Open source - The Military Should Use and I have used in the past. (Dep Var) \* (Ind Var) Military vs. Civilians**

Model 3			Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)		Total
			Military	Civilian	
Strongly Agree	Count		41	3	44
	% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)		16.6%	21.4%	16.9%
	% of Total		15.7%	1.1%	16.9%
Agree Somewhat	Count		136	6	142
	% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)		55.1%	42.9%	54.4%

Neither Agree Nor Disagree	% of Total	52.1%	2.3%	54.4%
	Count	65	4	69
	% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	26.3%	28.6%	26.4%
Disagree Somewhat	% of Total	24.9%	1.5%	26.4%
	Count	5	1	6
	% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	2.0%	7.1%	2.3%
Total	% of Total	1.9%	.4%	2.3%
	Count	247	14	261
	% within Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	94.6%	5.4%	100.0%

### Symmetric Measures

Model 3		Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.061	.250	.244	.807
	Spearman Correlation	.017	.071	.278	.782 (c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.024	.074	.391	.696 (c)
N of Valid Cases		261			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					
c Based on normal approximation.					

Table C23: Note: Insignificant Result - Weak positive Gamma (.061) and Pearson's R (.024) -Statistically not significant. Can not reject the Null Hypothesis. Chances of getting this result randomly are much greater than .01/.05%.

**Table C24**

### Cross-tab

#### Research Model Number 3: Value of the Media and Open source - The Military Should Use and I have used in the past.(Dep Var) \* (Ind Var) Army vs. Others

Model 3			Army Vs All Other Branches		Total
			Army	Non Army	
Strongly Agree	Count		39	5	44
	% within Army Vs All Other Branches		18.3%	10.6%	16.9%
	% of Total		15.0%	1.9%	16.9%
Agree Somewhat	Count		114	28	142
	% within Army Vs All Other Branches		53.5%	59.6%	54.6%
	% of Total		43.8%	10.8%	54.6%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Count		56	12	68
	% within Army Vs All Other Branches		26.3%	25.5%	26.2%
	% of Total		21.5%	4.6%	26.2%
Disagree Somewhat	Count		4	2	6
	% within Army Vs All Other Branches		1.9%	4.3%	2.3%

Total	% of Total	1.5%	.8%	2.3%
	Count	213	47	260
	% within Army Vs All Other Branches	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	81.9%	18.1%	100.0%

### Symmetric Measures

Model 3		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.126	.133	.929	.353
	Spearman Correlation	.055	.059	.888	.375 (c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.063	.060	1.018	.310 (c)
N of Valid Cases		260			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					
c Based on normal approximation.					

Table C24: Note: Insignificant Result - Weak positive Gamma (.126) and Pearson's R (.063) -Statistically not significant. Can not reject the Null Hypothesis. Chances of getting this result randomly are much greater than .01/.05%.

### Table C25

### Cross-tab

### Research Model Number 3: Value of the Media and Open source - The Military Should Use and I have used in the past.(Dep Var) \* (Ind Var) MI vs. Others

Model 3		MI Vs All Others		Total
		MI	All others	
Strongly Agree	Count	16	28	44
	% within MI Vs All Others	47.1%	12.4%	16.9%
	% of Total	6.2%	10.8%	16.9%
Agree Somewhat	Count	17	125	142
	% within MI Vs All Others	50.0%	55.3%	54.6%
	% of Total	6.5%	48.1%	54.6%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Count	1	67	68
	% within MI Vs All Others	2.9%	29.6%	26.2%
	% of Total	.4%	25.8%	26.2%
Disagree Somewhat	Count		6	6
	% within MI Vs All Others		2.7%	2.3%
	% of Total		2.3%	2.3%
Total	Count	34	226	260
	% within MI Vs All Others	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	13.1%	86.9%	100.0%

### Symmetric Measures

Model 3		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.751	.079	4.972	.000
	Spearman Correlation	.319	.051	5.403	.000 (c)

Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.317	.051	5.363	.000 (c)
N of Valid Cases		260			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					
c Based on normal approximation.					

Table C26: Note: Moderate to Strong Result. - Moderate to strong positive direction. Gamma (.751) and Pearson's R (.317) -Statistically significant. The Null Hypothesis is rejected. The chances of getting this result randomly are less than .01%. MI officers agreed at a higher rate than Others did. The top part of the table shows 47% to 12% strongly agree and the correlation can be followed viewing the chart above.

**Table C26**

**Cross-tab**

**Research Model Number 3: Value of the Media and Open source - The Military Should Use and I have used in the past.(Dep Var) \* (Ind Var) Political View - Liberal to Moderate vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.**

Model 3		Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.		Total
		Moderate to Very Liberal	Somewhat to Very Conservative	
Strongly Agree	Count	20	24	44
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	21.3%	14.4%	16.9%
	% of Total	7.7%	9.2%	16.9%
Agree Somewhat	Count	45	97	142
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	47.9%	58.1%	54.4%
	% of Total	17.2%	37.2%	54.4%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Count	26	43	69
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	27.7%	25.7%	26.4%
	% of Total	10.0%	16.5%	26.4%
Disagree Somewhat	Count	3	3	6
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	3.2%	1.8%	2.3%
	% of Total	1.1%	1.1%	2.3%
Total	Count	94	167	261
	% within Political View - Liberal to Moderate Vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	36.0%	64.0%	100.0%

**Symmetric Measures**

Model 3		Value	Asymp. Std. Error (a)	Approx. T (b)	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.030	.113	.265	.791

	Spearman Correlation	.017	.064	.274	.784 (c)
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.015	.064	.240	.811 (c)
N of Valid Cases		261			
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.					
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.					
c Based on normal approximation.					

Table C26: Note: Insignificant Result - Weak positive Gamma (.030) and Pearson's R (.015) -Statistically not significant. Can not reject the Null Hypothesis. Chances of getting this result randomly are much greater than .01/.05%.

**Table C27**

**Cross-tab**

**Research Model Number 3: Value of the Media and Open source - The Military Should Use and I have used in the past.(Dep Var) \* (Ind Var)Faculty vs. Students**

**Model Summary**

Model	R	R SQUARE	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
3	.351 (a)	.123	.106	1.9027
a Predictors: (Constant), Political View - Liberal to Moderate vs Somewhat to Very Conservative., Army vs All Other Branches , Faculty Vs. Students, MI vs All Others, Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)				

**ANOVA (b)**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
3	Regression	129.314	5	25.863	7.144	.000 (a)
	Residual	919.547	254	3.620		
	Total	1048.862	259			
a Predictors: (Constant), Political View - Liberal to Moderate vs Somewhat to Very Conservative., Army vs All Other Branches , Faculty Vs. Students, MI vs All Others, Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)						
b Dependent Variable: Value of the Media and Open source - The Military Should Use and I have used in the past						

**Coefficients (a)**

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.		
Model 3		B	Std. Error	Beta				
Ind Variables	(Constant)	2.540	.998		2.547	.011		
	(1) FACULTY VS. STUDENTS	-.472	.269	-.103	-1.752	.081		
	(2) Military and Civilian (Pure Civilian - No former Military)	.04313	.605	.005	.071	.943		
	(3) Army vs All Other Branches	.05040	.348	-.010	-.145	.885		
	(4) MI VS ALL OTHERS	2.035	.357	.342	5.702	.000		
	(5) Political View - Liberal to Moderate vs Somewhat to Very Conservative.	.03529	.247	-.008	-.143	.886		
a Dependent Variable: Value of the Media and Open source - The Military Should Use and I have								

**Table C27: NOTE: Model (3) Multiple Regression:**

The R square (model summary) is only twelve point 3 percent (12.3%) indicating that the five independent variables only account for 12.3% of the variation in the dependant variable result. The independent variables have a weak relationship overall. ANOVA (analysis of variance): The F statistic is significant (7.144), indicating that the simultaneous test that each coefficient is 0 (same response) is rejected. The fact that the associated probability (Sig) is so small (0.000) does not imply that each of the independent variables makes a meaningful contribution to the fit of the model.

(Coefficients: Note: The independent Variables are labeled 1 to 5 above) Independent variable 1 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement (ID) there is only a -.472 unit of movement in the dependant variable (B column). The statistical t above is -1.752 and shows a significance level of .081. Variable 1 shows less than a 10% chance of getting this result randomly. Independent Variable 2 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement (ID) there is only a .04313 unit of movement in the dependant variable (B column). The statistical t is only .071 and shows a significance level of .943. This result indicates a great deal of chance in getting this result (much greater than 10%). Independent Variable 3 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement (ID) there is only -.05040 unit of movement in the dependant variable (B column). The statistical t is only -.145 and shows a significance level of .885. This result indicates a great deal of chance in getting this result (much greater than 10%). Independent Variable 4 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement (ID) there is a 2.035 unit of movement in the dependant variable (B column). The statistical t is 5.702 and shows a significance level of .000. Variable 4 shows less than a 1% chance of getting this result randomly. Independent variable 5 indicates that for each 1 unit of movement (ID) there is only a .03529 unit of movement in the dependant variable (B column). The statistical t above is -.143 and shows a significance level of .886. This result indicates a great deal of chance in getting this result (much greater than 10%).

**Summary of Research Model Number three:** There is little significance in tables C22, 23, 24, and 26 (Ind Variables 1,2,3,5). Although, using Gamma and Pearson's R there is a weak negative relationship between students and faculty. Students see more value in using the media although the result is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level it is interesting. Tables C22,23, 24, and 26 results indicate that the null hypothesis can not be rejected for these independent variables. The results could have been found randomly in the general Army War College Population. The only null hypothesis we can reject easily is the one connected with the MI officers and Others (Ind Variable 4).

Table C25 shows a Gamma correlation that has a moderate to strong positive direction. The gamma correlation was .751 and is

significant at the 1 percent level. In other words the null hypothesis is rejected. In statistical terms the MI officers see a great value in using the media more than others. Chances of getting this result randomly within the general Army War College population is less than one percent.

The Multiple regression table C27 shows that the R square is only 12.3 percent, indicating that the five independent variables only account for twelve point three percent (12.3 percent) of the result. The independent variables have a weak relationship overall. An interesting area besides the R square result is the significance level of variable 4. The statistical T obtained in independent variable 4 is 5.702 with a significance of level of 1 percent. It displayed MI officers above all see the usefulness of the Media and open source information.

Clearly from the earlier general population frequency tables it was apparent that the general Army War College population credit the media with a great deal of not only power to effect foreign policy, effect public opinion, and is in fact useful. Again the only group that stood-out statistically were the MI officers as expected.

#### Overall Suggested Courses of Action and Conclusion

The intelligence system at the national level clearly is aware of open sources of information. Different elements within the intelligence system use open source each day. An example of what the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), LTG Patrick Hughes, thinks about the subject is captured in an e-mail received August 19, 1998. In part of that e-mail, LTG Hughes stated, "DIA is currently using open source information

as you described, to maintain both situational awareness and dominant knowledge about the political-military circumstances we face. We have a substantial investment in connectivity and technology in order to do that."<sup>24</sup>

Major General John Thomas, the Commandant of the Intelligence Center and School, stated, "This is a good subject and I think you are right on the mark. We are installing two classrooms that can access the open source system. Our courses also require open source research. Your work will be valuable to us."<sup>25</sup> Training time and classrooms are being devoted to training intelligence officers and soldiers to use what already exists, essentially free, to find information required by operational and strategic planners. The intelligence leadership is clearly on-board, and there must be a continued push for comprehensive programs at all levels to manage and leverage the chaos we call media and open source material.

There must be a significant effort to leverage open source information in formal research and development programs, training at every level, every aspect of intelligence collection planning, and finally in the formal Joint Requirements System. Without a significant effort coupled with planned resources, to include equipment and personnel, the intelligence community will find it increasingly more difficult to provide situational

awareness to the strategic leaders as technology moves into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

The formal Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process (J-2 Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance/J-3/J-6 Information Warfare), and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) should be used to address this important aspect of leveraging and managing media flow, and all forms of information and open source chaos. This is clearly a joint requirement with a great deal of importance to the services. The system must get beyond what could be describe as a spotty, less than optimal system of taking advantage of what is required for the future VUCA world. The issue must be addressed across all joint and governmental staff lines. This subject affects all, and clearly is very fussy in terms of staff responsibility.

Each service and each person responsible for those that either make important life and death decisions, or those that execute those decisions, should look in their own backyard and act to move an inch-at-a-time closer to more clarity. Don't wait for the perfect solution that will not likely come despite the many great Americans, "tilting at windmills."

The suggested changes in this paper will not solve all the problems associated with the VUCA environment now and out to 2010, but can make a significant contribution. There are no

easy solutions to the difficult problem of providing accurate, timely, and fused intelligence to the nations leaders.

Even if all the problems associated with providing a clearer picture are not solved it is suggested that the system at least look at the relationship with the media much like Chief Warrant Officer *Eric Carlson, USMC*. *"We didn't view the news media as a group of people we were supposed to schmoose." "We regarded them as an environmental feature of the Battlefield, kind of like the rain. If it rains, you operate wet."*<sup>26</sup>

Through a concerted Joint effort the military can do much better than just "operate wet." The military must tap everything from the professor that is the one expert on an important country or subject, to the most sophisticated levels of electronic media and information flowing. A great deal of information is essentially free for the taking, necessary for clarification in the VUCA world, and required by strategic military leaders down to the level of those that will get dumped into the next inhospitable location, conducting the business of their country.

(Word Count 5,748-minus Survey Sections)

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Charles C. Moskos, Department of Sociology, Northwestern University with Thomas E. Ricks, Pentagon Correspondent, The Wall Street Journal, Reporting War When There Is No War, (Published by the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1996), Chapter II.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>3</sup> Neuman, Johanna, Lights, Camera, War Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 10-11.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>6</sup> Snow, Donald M. and Brown, Eugene, Puzzle Palaces and Foggy bottom U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990s, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 232.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 212-217.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 213-214.

<sup>9</sup> Neuman, Johanna, Lights, Camera, War Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 42.

<sup>10</sup> Kull, Steven, Destler, I.M., Ramsay, Clay, "The Foreign Policy Gap How Policymakers Misread the Public," A Report of a Study By: The Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and its Program on International Policy Attitudes, (October 1997), 172.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 172.

<sup>12</sup> Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, The Changing Nature of Conflict, (Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1996), 10.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 22, 23.

<sup>17</sup> Steele, Robert D., "The Importance of Open source Intelligence to the Military," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, (Winter 1995, Volume 8, Number 4): 457.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 458.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 459.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 466.

<sup>22</sup> **Crosstabulation.** A technique for measuring the relationship between nominal and ordinal level measures. In other words: A Crosstabulation or "Crosstab" takes each case in a set of observations and displays the value of the that case for both variables in a table.

<sup>23</sup> **Multiple regression.** A technique for measuring the mathematical relationships between more than one independent variable and a dependent variable, while controlling for all other independent variables in the equation.

<sup>24</sup> LTG Patrick Hughes [hpatm@aol.com](mailto:hpatm@aol.com), "Re Potential strategic research project at War College for Colonel Robert (Bob) Seetin," electronic mail message to Colonel Robert Seetin [seetinr@awc.carlisle.army.mil](mailto:seetinr@awc.carlisle.army.mil). 19 August 1998.

<sup>25</sup> MG John Thomas [thomasjd@huachuca-emh1.army.mil](mailto:thomasjd@huachuca-emh1.army.mil), "Re Senior Research Project AWC - Colonel Bob Seetin 9-27-98," electronic mail message to Colonel Robert Seetin [seetinr@awc.carlisle.army.mil](mailto:seetinr@awc.carlisle.army.mil). 12 October 1998.

<sup>26</sup> Neuman, Johanna, Lights, Camera, War Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 10-11.

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